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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-1631 
_____________ 
 
STEVEN M. STIEGEL, 
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PETERS TOWNSHIP; OFFICER MATTHEW RUSSELL COLLINS 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2:12-cv-00377) 
District Judge:  Honorable Terrence F. McVerry 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 9, 2014 
 
Before:   VANASKIE, COWEN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  December 9, 2014) 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT* 
______________
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Steven M. Stiegel appeals from the final decision of the District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania, dated February 24, 2014, granting summary 
judgment against him and in favor of Peters Township and Officer Matthew Russell 
Collins. Stiegel v. Peters Twp., No. 2:12–cv–377, 2014 WL 695571, at *11 (W.D. Pa. 
Feb. 24, 2014). For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the decision of the District 
Court. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 This appeal arises out of events that occurred on the night of January 30, 2012.  
Stiegel, 2014 WL 695571, at *1. That night, Steven M. Stiegel (“Stiegel” or “Appellant”) 
was hunting with his friend Nolan Majcher (“Majcher”) on private property located in 
North Strabane Township, Pennsylvania. Id. Stiegel and Majcher are both licensed to 
hunt and possess firearms. Id. Around 11:00 pm, the men’s hunting was interrupted by 
Officer Matthew Russell Collins (“Collins”). Id. Collins has been an officer with the 
Peters Township Police Department since 1995. Id. Peters Township neighbors North 
Strabane Township. Id. 
 Collins was working as the shift supervisor for the Peters Township Police 
Department that evening. Id. While Collins was traveling to the scene of a reported 
domestic disturbance, he noticed a single vehicle parked near a pull-off on North Spring 
Valley Road. Id. The presence of the vehicle seemed both “unusual” and “suspicious” to 
Collins, as the vehicle was parked (1) several hundred yards from any residences, (2) at 
nighttime in a rural, unlit area, and (3) in an area where Collins himself had encountered 
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criminal activity in the past. Id. at *1, n.1. Further, the owner of the land where the car 
was parked had previously complained to Collins about trespassing and other illegal 
activity occurring on his property. Id. He had asked Collins to “keep an eye out” for 
trespassers and other criminal activity. Id. Because of his suspicions, Collins decided to 
approach the vehicle to assess the situation. Id. at *1.  
 As Collins approached the stopped vehicle in his squad car, he saw Majcher sitting 
on the hillside, wearing camouflage, with a shotgun in his lap. Id. at *2. Majcher’s 
shotgun was pointed in Collins’s general direction. Id. Collins stated that he was 
concerned that Majcher was either preparing for a home invasion or to commit suicide. 
(Collins Dep., at 16). Collins then pulled his squad car next to the stopped vehicle. 
Stiegel, 2014 WL 695571, at *2. He did not activate the squad car’s emergency lights or 
announce himself as an officer. Id. Even without the emergency lights or announcement, 
Majcher surmised that Collins was affiliated with law enforcement. Id.  
 As he approached Majcher, Collins instructed him to place his weapon on the 
ground. Rather than complying with Collins’s request, Majcher stood up and took a few 
steps toward Collins. Id. As Majcher approached, he was still holding his shotgun, albeit 
in a vertical position. Id. At that point, Collins aggressively repeated his command for 
Majcher to place his weapon on the ground; he simultaneously unholstered his service 
pistol and pointed it at Majcher. Id. Majcher then complied with Collins’s request and 
placed his shotgun on the ground. Id. He approached the squad car with his hands raised 
to shoulder-height, identified himself, and explained that he and a friend—Stiegel—were 
fox hunting on the property with the property owner’s permission. Id. 
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 After Majcher mentioned Stiegel, Collins scanned the field using his personal 
flashlight and observed Stiegel holding a shotgun. Id. Collins then aimed his service 
weapon at Stiegel and instructed him to drop his shotgun or else he would be shot. Id. In 
Stiegel’s deposition, he testified that he never saw a gun pointed at him because of the 
glare from Collins’s flashlight. (Stiegel Dep., at 35–36). As Stiegel approached Collins 
and Majcher, Collins determined that both men were complying with his requests. 
Stiegel, 2014 WL 695571, at *2. He then holstered his firearm before Stiegel reached his 
car. Id. Collins inspected Stiegel’s identification, the three men had a brief conversation, 
and then Collins left the scene. Id. at *3. The entire encounter lasted approximately five 
to ten minutes. Id. Neither Steigel nor Majcher was issued a citation, and the parties agree 
that the two men were legally hunting on the premises that evening. Id. 
 After the incident, Stiegel lodged both formal and informal complaints against 
Collins with the Peters Township Police Department. Id. at *3–4. The department 
conducted an internal investigation of the incident. Id. at *4. After the investigation 
concluded that Collins did not violate any department policies, Stiegel filed a three-count 
Complaint in federal district court alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Id. at 
*5. More specifically, Count I of the Complaint sought relief against Collins pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating Stiegel’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Count II 
alleged that Peters Township was also liable for Collins’s actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
because it had a policy, custom, or practice of acquiescing to this type of behavior. Count 
III sought relief from both defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1988. 
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 By Memorandum and Order dated July 30, 2012, the District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania denied a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants and 
partially granted their accompanying motion to strike certain paragraphs from the 
pleadings. Stiegel v. Peters Twp., No. 2:12–cv–00377, 2012 WL 3096663, at *8 (W.D. 
Pa. July 30, 2012). At the close of discovery, the defendants moved for summary 
judgment. By Memorandum and Order dated February 24, 2014, the district court granted 
defendants’ request and entered judgment for the defendants and against Stiegel. Stiegel 
v. Peters Twp., No. 2:12–cv–377, 2014 WL 695571, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2014). 
Stiegel timely filed this appeal on March 14, 2014. On appeal, Stiegel argues (1) that 
Collins did not have reasonable suspicion to seize him, (2) that Collins used excessive 
force in effectuating the seizure, and (3) that Peters Township authorized Collins’s 
actions and should therefore be held liable for them. For the following reasons, we reject 
each of these arguments. We therefore affirm the decision of the District Court granting 
summary judgment in favor of Collins and Peters Township. 
II.  DISCUSSION1 
 1.  Standard of Review  
 This Court exercises plenary review over a district court order granting summary 
judgment. Bushman v. Halm, 798 F. 2d 651, 656 (3d Cir. 1986). Therefore, our review is 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction to hear Stiegel’s complaints of violations of 
his constitutional rights pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3). We 
have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s February 24, 2014, Order granting 
Collins’s and Peters Township’s motions for summary judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291. 
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identical to the review performed by the district court. Id. Summary judgment is 
appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” under 
Rule 56 if its existence or nonexistence might impact the outcome of the suit under the 
applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A 
dispute over a material fact is “genuine” if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 
the nonmoving party.” Id.  
 The moving party bears the burden of identifying specific portions of the record 
that establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the 
nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and “come forward with ‘specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). When 
determining a motion for summary judgment, we must construe all evidence in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 261 n.2. We are also mindful that 
“the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the 
matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 249.  
2.  The Initial Stop   
 Stiegel first argues that the District Court erred in finding that Collins was 
authorized under the law to conduct an investigatory stop of Stiegel. (Appellant Brief at 
21). The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
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searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A person is “seized” for Fourth 
Amendment purposes when, “in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a 
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).  
 One type of police-citizen interaction that constitutes a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment is an investigatory stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 293 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (“It must 
be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his 
freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.”). Investigatory, or Terry, stops must 
be justified by reasonable suspicion. Id. at 21. Reasonable suspicion is measured through 
an analysis of the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding the investigatory stop. 
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 
411, 417 (1981)). To establish reasonable suspicion, “the police officer must be able to 
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from 
those facts, reasonably warrant [the seizure].” Terry, 293 U.S. at 21. Reasonable 
suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, yet it still requires more than 
an officer’s mere suspicions or hunches. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.  
 At the outset of our inquiry, we note that the parties do not contest the fact that a 
seizure occurred, as it is evident that a reasonable person in Stiegel’s position on the night 
of January 30, 2012, “would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. at 554. In his Reply Brief, Stiegel briefly contends that his interaction with 
Collins amounted to a “de facto” arrest, which requires probable cause. We find that it 
did not. There is no bright-line rule establishing that an officer’s display of his service 
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weapon automatically elevates an investigatory stop into an arrest. Baker v. Monroe 
Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1193 (3d Cir. 2005). There were no other elements of a typical arrest 
present in this case other than Collins’s temporary use of his service weapon. Collins did 
not handcuff the men, he did not issue them a citation, and the entire encounter lasted 
only five to ten minutes. We therefore agree with the District Court that this encounter is 
best characterized as an investigatory stop. Stiegel, 2014 WL 695571, at *10. 
 We must accordingly determine whether Collins had reasonable suspicion to stop 
Stiegel. We find that he did. Collins personally saw a single vehicle parked in a strange 
and questionable position: “several hundred yards from any houses around 11:00 pm on 
an unlit dead-end road near an area where he encountered criminal activity in the past and 
where vehicles do not commonly park at night.” Stiegel, 2014 WL 695571, at *1. Upon 
approaching the vehicle, Collins observed Majcher, who was carrying a shotgun. Id. at 
*2.  Majcher did not immediately comply with Collins’s requests to place his weapon on 
the ground. Id. After Majcher indicated that he was not alone in the area, Collins 
discovered Stiegel—a second armed individual in an area where Collins had personally 
observed criminal activity in the past.  
 We briefly note that Appellant’s reliance on Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), 
is misplaced. That case involved an officer acting solely on an anonymous tip that a 
“young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was 
carrying a gun.” Id. at 268. Here, Collins was not acting on the basis of an anonymous tip 
that an individual had a gun; rather, he personally observed a suspicious scene. After he 
stopped to investigate the situation, he saw Majcher and Collins both carrying shotguns. 
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This situation is much different from the factual scenario at issue in Florida v. J.L. We 
therefore find that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interaction between 
Stiegel and Collins demonstrates that there were “specific, articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted [the seizure of 
Stiegel].” Terry, 293 U.S. at 21. 
3.  The Use of Force 
 Stiegel next argues that Collins’s act of pointing a gun at him as he left the woods 
and approached the squad car constituted excessive force. In Graham v. Connor, the 
Supreme Court held that the proper test for evaluating a claim of excessive force is one of 
objective reasonableness. 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). To determine objective 
reasonableness, courts must balance the “nature and quality of the intrusion on the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental 
interests at stake.” Id. at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tennessee v. 
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). The Supreme Court has cautioned that this inquiry is fact 
specific and should be done on a case-by-case basis. Id. (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 8–9).  
 Despite the fact-intensive nature of this inquiry, the Court has articulated three 
factors that serve as guideposts for determining whether the use of force was reasonable 
in a given case: (1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect poses an 
imminent threat to the safety of the police or others in the vicinity, and (3) whether the 
suspect attempts to resist arrest or flee the scene. Id. This Circuit has found that other 
factors may be relevant as well, including “the possibility that the persons subject to the 
police action are themselves violent or dangerous, the duration of the action, whether the 
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action takes place in the context of effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may 
be armed, and the number of persons with whom the police officers must contend at one 
time.” Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 Several cases from this and other circuits have used the Graham factors to 
determine whether an officer’s act of drawing his weapon during an encounter with a 
citizen was justified. These cases divide into two categories: (1) cases where an officer 
was justified in displaying his weapon because he reasonably perceived that he was in 
danger, and (2) cases where the display was not warranted because there was no threat to 
officer safety. 
 Several circuits have held that it is not a constitutional violation for a police officer 
to point a gun at an individual who poses a reasonable threat of danger or violence to 
police. One example of this situation occurred where an officer was alone with three 
individuals suspected of criminal activity. Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1483–
84, 1496 (11th Cir. 1991). There, because the officer was outnumbered and the 
individuals were belligerent, the Eleventh Circuit found the officer was justified in 
displaying his weapon. Id. Similarly, this Circuit found that there was a reasonable threat 
of danger where officers were arresting four men who were suspected of drug 
involvement and violence. Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997). In 
Sharrar, we determined that the threat level posed by the situation was sufficient to 
justify “calling over twenty officers to the scene, including a SWAT team armed with 
machine guns and an FBI hostage negotiator.” Id. at 821. While we acknowledged in 
Sharrar that the officers’ conduct “appear[ed] to be more akin to the Rambo-type 
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behavior associated with police in overdramatized B movies or TV shows,” we still found 
that it did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Id. at 822. 
 Similarly, courts have found that it is a constitutional violation for a police officer 
to point a gun at an individual who does not pose a reasonable threat of danger or 
violence to police. Several of these cases involved an officer drawing a weapon on an 
unarmed child. See, e.g., Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) 
(finding excessive force where officer trained a firearm on an infant during a sweep of a 
gang member’s house); Holland v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1192–93 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(finding excessive force where officers “continu[ed] to hold the children directly at 
gunpoint after the officers had gained complete control of the situation”); McDonald v. 
Haskins, 966 F.2d 292, 294–95 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding excessive force where officer 
held a gun to the head of a nine-year-old child who was not suspected of any crime 
during a search of the child’s family home). 
 Other cases have found excessive force where officers train their guns on 
compliant adults who pose no threat to the safety of the police. For example, the Seventh 
Circuit found excessive force where an officer, in the course of executing a search 
warrant based on a nonviolent crime, “wield[ed] a 9–millimeter submachine gun, which 
he used to detain various people at the search site.” Baird v. Renbarger, 576 F.3d 340, 
342, 344–45 (7th Cir. 2009). Other courts have found excessive force in similar 
circumstances. See, e.g., Robinson v. Solano Cty., 278 F.3d 1007, 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 
2002) (finding excessive force where two officers pointed guns from point-blank range at 
the head of individual suspected of a misdemeanor); Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 
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1186, 1193–94 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding excessive force where police held suspect’s family 
members, two of whom were minors, on the ground at gunpoint while they searched the 
alleged suspect’s house); Brown v. City of Milwaukee, 288 F. Supp. 2d 962, 972–73 (E.D. 
Wisc. 2003) (finding excessive force where police surrounded suspect’s car, pointed 
multiple guns at her, shouted obscenities, used sensory overload tactics, and injured 
suspect).  
 Viewing Stiegel’s claim through the lens of the Graham test, we note first that the 
government has a strong interest in ensuring that police are not forced to subject 
themselves to unreasonable danger while carrying out their duties. We use the Graham 
factors to determine whether the intrusion on Stiegel outweighed that interest in this case. 
When Collins approached Majcher, he suspected that Majcher may be preparing for a 
home invasion or suicide. Both of these activities are severe and violent; however, it is 
unclear whether Collins still suspected the men of home invasion or suicide when he 
trained his gun on Stiegel. Therefore, the first factor is inconclusive in this instance. 
However, the second and third Graham factors weigh in favor of using force, as Stiegel 
and Majcher outnumbered Collins, were both armed with shotguns, and Majcher did not 
immediately comply with Collins’s request to place his weapon on the ground.   
 The additional factors described by this Circuit in Sharrar also compel a finding 
that Collins’s use of force was justified. First, from Collins’s perspective, there was a 
possibility that Stiegel and Majcher were violent or dangerous, as Collins came across 
them at night, in a remote location that he associated with criminal activity. Further, 
Collins did not arrest either suspect, and the entire encounter between Collins and the two 
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men lasted only five to ten minutes. Finally, both Stiegel and Majcher were armed, and 
they outnumbered Collins. 
 We also note that the situation in this case is more akin to the cases from this and 
other circuits that have found that an officer’s display of a weapon was justified than to 
the cases that found excessive force. In this case, both suspects were adult men. Cf. 
Motley, 432 F.3d at 1089 (excessive force where officer pointed gun at infant); Holland, 
268 F.3d at 1192–93 (excessive force where officer pointed gun at children); McDonald, 
966 F.2d at 294–95 (excessive force where officer pointed gun at nine-year-old). Further, 
the officer, Collins, was outnumbered by Stiegel and Collins. See Courson, 939 F.2d at 
1483–84 (display of gun justified where officer was outnumbered). Both suspects were 
also armed. Cf. Robinson, 278 F.3d at 1015–16 (finding excessive force where officer 
pointed gun at unarmed suspect). Majcher did not immediately comply with Collins’s 
request to disarm. Cf. Baird, 576 F.3d at 346 (“[P]ointing a gun at a compliant adult in a 
non-threatening situation . . . can also constitute excessive force.” (emphasis added)). 
Finally, Collins’s use of his service weapon was limited—he displayed it for a short 
amount of time and holstered it once the situation was under control. Cf. Brown, 288 F. 
Supp. 2d at 972–73 (police used sensory overload tactics, shouted obscenities at suspect, 
pointed multiple guns at her, and caused physical injury to her).  
 In assessing the objective reasonableness of Collins’s actions, we remember that 
“[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers 
are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, 
uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a 
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particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. We therefore find that the totality of 
the circumstances in this instance, even where we construe all facts in favor of Stiegel, 
indicates that Collins was justified in temporarily unholstering his weapon and training it 
on both men while he assessed and gained control over the situation. He was similarly 
justified in placing his weapon back in its holster once he was comfortable that both men 
were cooperating. For these reasons, we agree with the District Court’s finding that no 
excessive force was used in this case.   
4. Stiegel’s Monell Claim 
 Stiegel also appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Peters Township. Specifically, Stiegel argues that Peters Township should be liable for 
Collins’s actions because it authorized them. However, the Supreme Court has held that 
courts cannot “authorize[ an] award of damages against a [municipality] based on the 
actions of one of its officers when in fact the jury has concluded that the officer inflicted 
no constitutional harm.” City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per 
curiam). Because we find that Stiegel has not suffered any constitutional harm at the 
hands of Collins, “the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the 
use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point.” Id. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.  
